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Abstract 
The dual-process model for moral cognition suggests that outcome-focused, consequentialist 
moral judgment in sacrificial moral dilemmas is driven by a deliberative, reasoned, cognitive 
process. While many studies have demonstrated a positive association of consequentialist 
judgment with measures for cognitive engagement, no work has investigated whether 
cognitive ability itself is also related to consequentialist judgment. Therefore, we conducted 
three studies to investigate if participants’ preference for consequentialist moral judgment is 
related to their intelligence. A meta-analytic integration of these three studies (with a total n = 
675) uncovered no association between both measures (r = -.02). Furthermore, a Bayesian re-
analysis of the same data provided substantial evidence in favor of a null effect (BFH0 = 7.2). 
As such, the present studies show that if consequentialist judgments depend on deliberative 
reasoning, this association is not driven by cognitive ability, but by cognitive motivation. 
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Introduction 
When is it morally appropriate to disregard the rights of the individual for the well-
being of the larger group? A burgeoning literature on peoples’ responses to ethical dilemmas 
has helped to provide an empirical backdrop on how we approach such issues. Central in this 
field is the study of trolley-style moral dilemmas in which participants are asked whether they 
consider it appropriate to actively sacrifice the life of a single individual to ensure that the 
lives of multiple others are saved. These dilemmas contrast an outcome-focused, 
consequentialist moral logic (i.e., sacrifice one to save many; Rosen, 2005), with a 
deontological moral logic that focusses on rights, duties and a disavowal of active harm 
(Alexander & Moore, 2008). The main theory within the field, a dual-process model, 
(Cushman, 2013; Greene, 2007), suggests that each of these two different perspectives is 
related to a different psychological process. When confronted with a moral dilemma, two 
processes compete to determine our judgment: a fast intuitive, automatic process that is linked 
with a preference for deontological moral judgment, and a cognitive, deliberative reasoning-
based process that steers our preference towards a consequentialist logic that weighs the 
harms versus the potential benefits of each course of action. 
This dual-process model was advanced in seminal work by Greene, Sommerville, 
Nystrom, Darley, and Cohen (2001). Using neuroimaging techniques, they uncovered that 
consequentialist moral judgment was associated with increased activation in “cognitive” areas 
of the brain such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, whereas deontological moral judgment 
was associated with increased activation in “emotional” areas of the brain such as the medial 
prefrontal cortex. The association of deontological judgment with emotional reactivity has 
been widely corroborated. For instance, individual differences in empathic concern are 
consistently associated with deontological judgment (r = .17, p = .02, n = 194, Kahane, 
Everett, Earp, Farias, & Savulescu, 2015; r = .28, p < .001, n = 112, Conway & Gawronski, 
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2013; r = .30, p < .001; n = 296, Reynolds & Conway; d = 0.64 & 0.52, p < .001 & < .001, n = 
718 & 366, Gleichgerrcht & Young, 2013). Interestingly, these associations are not related to 
concern for the sacrificial victim but because people high in empathic concern are more 
aversive of the sacrificial action (Miller, Hannikainen, & Cushman, 2014).  
In contrast, the association of deliberate cognition with consequentialist judgment 
appears to be more tenuous. Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom & Cohen (2008) 
attempted to experimentally decrease participants’ inclination to deliberate and found that a 
concurrent cognitive load decreased the speed of consequentialist but not deontological 
judgments (p = .002, n = 82)1. Some studies have failed to replicate this effect (d = 0.10, p = 
.110, n = 311, Tinghög et al., 2016; p = .273, n = 85, Cova et al., 2018), while others have 
uncovered a load effect not on response time but on participants’ overall inclination towards 
consequentialist judgment (d = 0.73, p = .009, n = 57, Conway & Gawronski, 2013; 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.033, p < .015, n = 191, Białek, & De Neys, 2017; see also, Trémolière, & Bonnefon, 2014). 
Relatedly, some studies have attempted to increase participants’ inclination to 
deliberate, for instance by administering the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick, 
2005). The CRT is a reasoning test that asks subjects to solve mathematical riddles. While the 
correct answers to these riddles require only elementary calculations, they necessitate the 
suppression of an intuitively appealing wrong answer. Paxton, Ungar, & Greene (2012) found 
that administering the CRT increased the likelihood of consequentialist judgment (d = 0.43, n 
= 91, p = .05) but another study failed to replicate this effect (d = -0.13, n = 297, p = .24, 
Cova et al., 2018). 
Individual difference studies are similarly mixed. Paxton, Ungar, & Greene (2012) 
report a positive association of participants’ CRT scores with consequentialist judgment (r = 
                                                 
1 Given that the Greene et al. study involves a within-subjects design we were unable to 
straightforwardly compute an effect size estimate from  the data provided in the manuscript. 
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.39, p = .001, n = 41). Aktas, Yilmaz, & Bahçekapili (2017) replicated this finding in a first 
study (r = .15, p < .01, n = 269), but not in a second one (r = .00, p > .05, n = 246), nor did 
Cova et al. (r = .08, p = .11, n = 316, 2018; see also Royzman, Landy, & Leeman, 2015; 
Baron, Scott, Fincher, & Metz 2015). 
One reason why the literature might be mixed is that deliberative reasoning has two 
components: a motivational component and an ability component. For a deliberative process 
to suppress intuitive processing, both the motivation to expend the necessary cognitive 
resources and the availability of these resources (i.e., cognitive ability) are relevant. The 
existing literature on the dual process model for moral cognition has not differentiated 
between the motivational and the ability component of deliberate reasoning. This is peculiar 
as Evans and Stanovich (2013) suggest that the ability component is in fact the “defining” 
aspect of deliberative reasoning. For most of the measures that have been used to study the 
association of “deliberate reasoning” with consequentialist judgment, the motivational and 
ability component are heavily entwined. For instance, the CRT is typically perceived as a 
measure for participants’ cognitive style (intuitive vs. reasoned) but it also correlates well 
with general intelligence (approximately r = .42, p < .001, n = 376, Saribay & Yilmaz, 2017). 
Any association that the CRT might (or might not) have with consequentialist judgment could 
be caused by either the motivational or the ability component of deliberate reasoning. 
Similarly, most experimental manipulations impact both motivation and ability 
simultaneously. A concurrent cognitive load does not only hinder participants’ ability to 
deliberate, it also impacts their motivation to complete a second demanding task (Roets & Van 
Hiel, 2011).  
Despite the large literature on the association of consequentialist moral judgments 
with deliberative reasoning, we are not aware of any study that has directly investigated 
whether cognitive ability itself plays a role in this connection. Perhaps most similar is a series 
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of studies by Moore, Clark, & Kane (2008) that investigated whether working memory 
capacity is related to consequentialist judgment, and did not find a consistent effect. 
Investigating the association between intelligence and consequentialist moral reasoning would 
help to clarify the nature of the inconsistent associations between consequentialist and 
deliberative reasoning in the literature. 
The current manuscript investigates this issue through an internal meta-analysis of 
three studies. The data for Study 1 was gathered as part of two unrelated projects. We decided 
to combine the cognitive ability and moral judgment data of both projects and investigate 
their possible association through an unplanned, exploratory test. The result of this test served 
as the impetus for gathering additional data. The data for Studies 2 and 3, while not 
preregistered, were gathered with the explicit intent of testing this association.2 No other 
hypotheses were explored for the latter two studies. We report how we determined our sample 
size, all data exclusions (none), and all measures in these studies. 
Method 
Participants and Sample Size. 
We conducted a total of three studies. Table 1 describes demographical statistics. For 
Studies 1 (n = 210) and 2 (n = 211), undergraduate students at a Belgian university completed 
the relevant measures for course credit. For Study 3 (n = 254), North-American participants 
were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and paid US$1.15. Participants in Studies 1 & 
2 were able to choose from multiple time slots but were not informed about the nature of the 
studies that would be conducted during each timeslot. For studies 1 and 2 we aimed for 
samples with n > 200 (80% power for r ≥ .20). For Study 3, we aimed for a more powerful 
                                                 
2 The cognitive ability measure from Study 2 was also used in an unrelated study (De keersmaecker, 
Dunning, Pennycook, Rand, Sanchez, Unkelbach, & Roets, in press). Only the cognitive ability measure was 
shared among datasets. 
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study (90% power when assuming a population effect size of r ≥ .20). No specific instructions 
were given to participants during any of the studies.  
Table 1 
Sample size and summary demographical statistics 
 N (Female) Mean Age (SD) Mean Conseq. (SD) Mean Deont. (SD) 
Study 1 210 (179) 18.81 (2.49) 3.00 (0.76) 2.31 (0.62) 
Study 2 211 (168) 18.66 (2.52) 0.47 (0.21) 0.71 (0.28) 
Study 3 254 (113) 36.03 (10.53) 2.88 (0.91) 2.87 (0.87) 
Note. Preference for Consequentialist and Deontological judgment are measured on a 
5-point scale (scores between 1 to 5) on Studies 1 and 3, but through Process Dissociation 
(scores between -1 to 1) on Study 2. 
 
Measures. 
Cognitive ability. In Studies 1 and 2, cognitive ability was measured with a shortened 
version of the Wilde Intelligence Test (λ2= .70 & .75; see Kersting, Althoff, & Jäger, 2008). In 
this test, participants are presented with 45 logic problems tapping into fluid intelligence, and 
are instructed to solve as many problems as possible in 12 minutes. The number of correct 
responses constitutes the participant’s ability score. 
In Study 3, cognitive ability was measured as the number of correct responses on the 
10-item WordSum test (α = .77), a vocabulary subtest from the WAIS (Zhu & Weiss, 2005), 
that is used as a measure for general intelligence in the General Social Survey. In this test, 
participants are presented with 10 target words and have to select for each target word, the 
word that comes closest to the meaning of the target from a set of five words. 
Preference for Consequentialist (and for Deontological) judgment. We used two 
different measures for these constructs. In Studies 1 and 3, participants were presented with a 
battery of 10 trolley-style dilemmas (Bostyn, Sevenhant, & Roets, 2018) and were asked for 
each of the two possible options within each dilemma to what extent they considered that 
option to be morally appropriate on a scale from (1) completely inappropriate to (5) 
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completely appropriate. This battery includes a mix of personal and impersonal dilemmas.3 
Participants’ preference for consequentialist judgment was calculated by averaging their 
appropriateness ratings of the consequentialist options (α = .87 & .88). A preference for 
deontological judgment was calculated similarly (α = .85 & .89). Deontological and 
consequentialist reasoning are envisioned to be driven by dissociable and independent mental 
processes (Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Greene et al., 2001). As such, we did not expect to 
find an association between cognitive ability and deontological reasoning.  
In Study 2, moral preferences were measured through a process dissociation approach 
developed by Conway & Gawronski (2013). This procedure contrasts participants’ responses 
on congruent dilemmas with their responses on incongruent dilemmas. Both types of 
dilemmas have the same structure as traditional trolley-style moral dilemmas but on 
incongruent dilemmas (similar to traditional trolley-style dilemmas), each moral preference is 
associated with a different response (e.g., “Torture someone to stop a bomb from exploding”) 
whereas on congruent dilemmas, participants’ preference for consequentialist and 
deontological judgment suggest the same response because the sacrificial harm does not 
outweigh the benefit that would be gained (e.g., “Torture someone to stop them from 
vandalizing a bus stop?”). Participants were confronted with 20 dilemmas, 10 of each kind, 
and were asked whether the suggested sacrificial harm was morally appropriate in a binary 
fashion (Yes/No). Each moral preference is then calculated through a set of equations 
(Conway & Gawronski, 2013). Some of the original dilemmas from Conway & Gawronski 
(2013) were interchanged by alternatives that are more culturally appropriate for our sample 
(see, Bostyn, Roets, & Van Hiel, 2016). All dilemmas used in all studies were framed from a 
first-person perspective and are available at https://osf.io/txvjb/. 
                                                 
3 Analyzing our data along this dimension did not impact any of the reported result.  
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Results 
Data and statistical code are available at https://osf.io/z7uxe/.  In each study, we 
correlated participants’ preference for consequentialist and deontological moral judgment 
with their cognitive ability. We then conducted a random-effects meta-analysis with a Paule-
Mandel estimator using the metafor package in R (Viechtbauer, 2010). Figure 1 displays the 
results of each study. Interestingly, we uncovered no association between cognitive ability and 
the participants’ propensity for consequentialist judgment, rmeta = -.02, pmeta = .415. A large 
amount of heterogeneity was present, I² = 71%, 95%CI = 0%, 99%, τ² = 0.10. However, given 
the small number of studies included in this meta-analysis we caution against interpretation of 
these heterogeneity estimates. 
To quantify the strength of the evidence in favor of a null effect compared to the 
expected positive association we calculated a directional meta-analytical Bayes Factor with 
the metaBMA package in R (Heck, Gronau, & Wagenmakers, 2017) using a model averaging 
approach that weights the results of fixed and a random effects meta-analysis. We used a half-
Normal prior (µ = 0, σ = 0.3) for the effect size and a half-Cauchy prior (scale factor = 0.5) 
for the between study variance (the default options in the package). This analysis suggested 
that, based on the current work, a null association between preference for consequentialist 
moral judgment and intelligence is 7.2 times more credible than the expected positive 
association. A prior sensitivity analysis (using 36 different prior combinations, reported in the 
online supplementary materials) found that BFH0 ranged from 2.73 to 199.5 (available at 
https://osf.io/wfasb/). The smallest Bayes factors were obtained when using priors that assume 
a high likelihood for a null effect, and the largest Bayes factors were obtained when using 
priors that assume a large positive effect. 
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Finally, though not the focus of the current manuscript, we uncovered no evidence for 
an association between preference for deontological judgment and cognitive ability, rmeta = 
.04, pmeta = .133, τ² = 0.02, I² = 8.78% , 95%CI = 0%, 98%). 




The dominant theoretical framework for moral cognition, the dual-process model, 
states that consequentialist judgment is driven by a deliberative cognitive process rather than 
through automatic processing. Research on this issue has uncovered a mixed set of findings, 
with some studies reporting positive effects and others reporting null effects (see supra). 
Importantly, previous research did not distinguish between the motivational and ability 
components of deliberate cognition. Investigating if cognitive ability is related to 
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consequentialist reasoning can inform which specific aspects of deliberative processing (if 
any) are driving the overall association. Based on previous work, one could have expected a 
positive association, however across a set of three studies we uncover no evidence for an 
association (rmeta = -.02).  
The current results clarify some aspects of the dual process model for moral cognition. 
To the extent that previous research has uncovered associations of measures for “deliberate 
cognition” with increased consequentialist responding, our study suggests that these 
associations are likely driven by participants’ cognitive motivation and not by their cognitive 
ability. Accordingly, these results qualify earlier work about the effect of cognitive load 
manipulations on moral reasoning (such as Greene et al., 2008), and suggest that these load 
manipulations sort their effect through inhibiting cognitive motivation rather than through 
ability reduction. 
One could argue that the lack of an association of consequentialist reasoning with 
intelligence is not surprising given the limited mathematical complexity of the 1 vs. 5 
comparison. However, reducing consequentialist choice to a game of “pick the higher 
number” ignores the maze of conflicting moral norms one has to navigate to make this choice. 
The complexity of this type of moral cognition does not lie in the math of the cost-benefit 
analysis. It lies in whether the consequentialist benefit outweighs violating several moral 
norms. Trolley dilemmas are hard, not because the underlying math is hard, but because 
weighing norms is hard. Additionally, consequentialist decisions require participants to 
assume responsibility for the dilemma situation. This puts them in social jeopardy as research 
has uncovered that consequentialists are seen as cold, unempathic and less trustworthy 
(Bostyn & Roets, 2017a; Everett, Faber, Savulescu, Crockett, 2018; Everett, Pizarro, & 
Crockett, 2016; Uhlmann, Zhu, Tannenbaum, 2013). Given the social and moral complexities 
involved, cognitive ability could very well have impacted participants’ decision making.  
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In any case, this null effect begs the question how measures of cognitive motivation 
can be associated with consequentialist decision making in the absence of an effect of ability. 
How can the motivation to deliberate have an impact when the ability to deliberate does not? 
One potential answer could be that individuals with a high motivation for deliberative 
thinking simply take more time to respond to dilemmas. Previous research has suggested that 
deontological judgment is driven by a strong emotionally aversive reaction to the sacrificial 
harm suggested in a trolley-style moral dilemma (Greene, 2007). If so, then taking longer to 
respond might lessen the impact of this emotional reaction. Perhaps the association of 
motivational measures with consequentialist decision making is not due to increased 
deliberation per se, but rather due to attenuation of the initial emotional response.  
The current studies have some limitations. A first limitation is that our study 
investigated moral decision making using hypothetical dilemmas. On all dilemmas 
participants were confronted with a limited set of potential actions and the outcome of each 
action was predetermined. While such dilemmas are common in psychological research, they 
might be too simplistic to measure moral decision making in the context of cognitive ability. 
Real-life moral decisions are fraught with uncertainty and in contrast to hypothetical 
judgments, the decisions made are actually consequential. We cannot preclude the possibility 
that real-life moral decision making might be more cognitively demanding than hypothetical 
decision making. Similarly, given that the current study only investigates moral decision 
making in the context of sacrificial moral dilemmas, we should be careful not to generalize 
our conclusions beyond such dilemmas. It is possible that other types of consequentialist 
moral reasoning (cf. impartial beneficence, Kahane Everett, Earp, Caviola, Faber, Crockett, & 
Savulesco, 2019) might be associated with cognitive ability. Finally, we restricted our 
investigation to the effects of cognitive ability in isolation from any measures of cognitive 
motivation. One could assume that any effect of cognitive ability would be most pronounced 
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for subjects that additionally have a high motivation towards reasoning cognition. While there 
is merit to a study including such variables, our samples contained participants that were both 
high and low in motivation. Even if cognitive ability and motivation interact and, even if the 
effect of cognitive ability emerges only for those that score high on motivation, we should still 
have uncovered an attenuated main effect of cognitive ability. Since our meta-analytic 
estimate is negative, we think it unlikely that this could explain our findings. 
In any case, Greene (2014) has argued that societal progress relies on assuming the 
meta-ethical perspective offered by consequentialist morality. At least from that vantage point, 
it seems encouraging that people’s ability to take a consequentialist perspective is not 
hindered by limitations in their cognitive ability.  
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Open Practice Statement 
 The data, statistical code and materials for all experiments are available at 
https://osf.io/z7uxe/.  
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